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We study the eﬀects of the Most-Favored Nation rule in an applicant’s
negotiation to join a club. When the applicant has to carry out a series
of bilateral bargains with the existing members, we ﬁnd that there are
two eﬀects of the MFN rule, viz. the hardened bargainer eﬀect and the
free-rider eﬀect. The former eﬀect tends to favor the applicant, while the
latter eﬀect tends to hurt the applicant. We ﬁnd that the free-rider eﬀect
is stronger the more asymmetric are the members. The hardened bargainer
eﬀect is stronger the larger is the “size of the pie”. As the number of
members increase, it is more likely that the hardened bargainer eﬀect would
dominate.
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in Club Enlargement Negotiation
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the world economy, countries very often form clubs with each other. Club members usually
confer mutual beneﬁts to each other through granting exclusive concessions to each other.
Because member countries can be very diﬀerent in size and stage of development, many
clubs allow diﬀerent members to grant diﬀerent levels of concessions to the rest of the club.
However, the most-favored nation (MFN) principle usually applies. According this principle,
each country must grant the same concession to all other members of the club. In other
words, a country cannot discriminate between any two member countries. Typically, when
an outside country wants to join a club, it has to conduct a series of bilateral negotiations with
the existing members of the club to determine the MFN concessions it has to make to each
member of the club. A good example of a club is the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Other examples are free trade areas such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the proposed Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA). In these clubs, the club
enlargement or accession negotiation process are similar – a series of bilateral negotiations
are conducted between the applicant country and the existing members of the club. In the
end, usually a (virtual) consensus is required for accession. (See, for example, WTO 1995a,
b and 2005.)1
Take the example of the accession to the WTO. According to the rules of the WTO,
when a non-member applies for accession, it has to ﬁrst propose a set of tariﬀ reductions
to all members of the Working Party, which consists of all the interested members of the
WTO. These countries usually include all the large trading countries in the WTO. After
that, the applicant has to conduct a series of bilateral market-access negotiations with each
member of the Working Party. Normally, the tariﬀ commitments of members would be ﬁxed
1In a free trade area, though tariﬀs between any two members are typically set to zero, other aspects of
market access may not be completely free of barriers. For example, in the NAFTA, aspects of market access
other than tariﬀs including investment, access by service providers, government procurement, intellectual
property rights, and capital control have to be negotiated among the members. However, even in these areas,
the MFN rule applies. The situation is similar in the proposed FTAA. See their website at http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/alca e.asp.
1by previous rounds of WTO/GATT negotiations, and would not be altered in the accession
negotiations. At the conclusion of this series of bilateral negotiations, the applicant would
usually have satisﬁed all the members of the Working Party. (See WTO 1995a, b and 2005.)
The objective of this paper is to explore the eﬀects of the MFN rule on the degree
of concession made by the applicant in the accession process: Would the applicant make
more concessions when MFN is required to be implemented immediately than when MFN
is temporarily exempted during the transition? What is the impact of the MFN rule on the
distribution of payoﬀs among the acceding country and the existing member countries? The
MFN principle is widely accepted in multilateral agreements ﬁrstly because it is perceived as
“fair” as it is non-discriminatory; secondly, it is easy to implement due to its simplicity. It
is therefore no wonder that MFN is a widely adopted rule in club enlargement negotiations.
However, we believe it is still worthwhile to explore the counter-factual cases of non-existence
of MFN rule, because it would help us understand the implications of the existing rules, and
to introduce remedies if some consequences of the existing rules are found to be undesirable.
There are indeed provisions for temporary exemptions of MFN in the WTO. For example, in
the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) negotiations under the auspices of the
WTO, many countries asked for temporary exemptions to the MFN rule. The GATS indeed
permits ﬁve to ten years of exemptions. Would the requirement of MFN in the accession
negotiations confer disadvantages to an acceding country? Or, what is the same question,
Would the applicant liberalize trade more from a temporary exemption from MFN? 2
The literature on the eﬀects of the MFN rule on tariﬀ negotiaton between members of a
club such as the WTO is quite rich. See, for example, Caplin and Krishna (1988), Ludema
(1991), Horn and Mavroidis (2001) and Saggi (forthcoming). For example, Saggi uses a
“competing supplier model” similar to the one explained in the appendix, and ﬁnds that
enforcing the MFN rule on tariﬀ reduction among existing members yields higher aggregate
welfare than non-enforcement of MFN. However, the literature on the eﬀects of the MFN
rule on accession negotiation is very thin.
We begin our analysis with a simple three-country model, where country 3 applies to
join a club currently formed by countries 1 and 2. We compare the two rules of accession
negotiation: the applicant conducting a series of bilateral negotiations with the requirement
2We do not consider the situation when an acceding country has pre-existing free trade agreements with
some members of the club. In such cases, the motivation of whether or not to seek exemption from MFN
would be diﬀerent from what is discussed in this paper.
2of MFN and without MFN requirement. We use the Nash bargaining model to capture the
negotiation process. Later in the paper, we generalize to the case with n countries.
The MFN principle says that any market access concessions oﬀered by the applicant to
any member has to be automatically granted to all existing members. This implies that
any deal that an applicant makes with a member country can be made more unfavorable
to the applicant country by subsequent negotiations with other countries. In other words,
the member countries with weaker bargaining positions can free-ride on the member country
with the strongest bargaining position. We can call this free-rider eﬀect.O n t h e o t h e r
hand, when an applicant gives up a dollar’s worth of concession to a member country, it
must be prepared to give up the same concession to each and every member. This would
harden the applicant’s bargaining position. Since all parties have the foresight to realize
this fact, it translates into a more favorable bargaining outcome for the applicant country.
We can call this hardened bargainer eﬀect.B e c a u s et h e s et w oe ﬀects tend to counteract each
other, it is not immediately clear whether the applicant would beneﬁto rb ed i s a d v a n t a g e d
by the existence of the MFN rule. Our analysis shows that the free-rider eﬀect is stronger
the more asymmetric are the members (i.e. the more uneven is the distribution of the cost-
beneﬁt ratios of the members under MFN). If the member countries are symmetric, the
free-rider eﬀect disappears, and the applicant is unambiguously favored by the MFN rule.
Moreover, if the total surplus to be divided (the “size of the pie”) is suﬃciently large, then
the hardened bargainer eﬀect would also dominate. When we generalize to the case with n
countries, we ﬁnd that it is more likely for the hardened bargainer eﬀect to dominate as n
increases. One policy implication of this paper is that allowing the acceding country to be
temporarily exempted from the MFN requirement might in fact induce the acceding country
to make more trade concessions. Thus, allowing a process of gradually phasing in the MFN
requirement not only helps the acceding country to adjust but also helps trade liberalization.
The economic intuition behind our result concerning the hardened bargaining position of
a central player (repeat player) in negotiations with a number of non-central players (non-
repeat player) can be traced to the study of collusive practice in the industrial organization
literature. Cooper (1986), Salop (1986) and Cooper and Fries (1991) pointed out that a
contractual clause, known as most-favored-customer (MFC), can be used by ﬁrms to facilitate
collusion. When a ﬁrm grants MFC to its customers, it guarantees that the customers will
get the lowest price among all its customers. They argue that MFC increases the cost of
price competition and, hence, facilitates collusion. In other words, ﬁrms can beneﬁtf r o m
guaranteeing the customers the lowest price.
3Our results also run parallel to those found in the law and economics literature. For
example, Spier (2002) suggested that the MFN clause in out-of-court settlement negotiations
between a single defendant and many plaintiﬀs can commit the defendant to get tough in
the earlier negotiations and allows her to gain a higher share of the bargaining surplus.
However, it can backﬁre if a later plaintiﬀ turns out to have a much stronger case than the
other plaintiﬀs. This is very similar to our two eﬀects – the applicant country beneﬁts from
being tough because of the commitment eﬀect of MFN, but it is hurt if there exists a member
country which has very strong bargaining position because it needs to be compensated a lot
before it is willing to settle a deal with the applicant, and that deal has to be given to
everybody else according to MFN.
Another interesting and novel result of this paper is that, as the number of countries
increases by duplication of existing types of member countries, it is more likely that the
hardened bargainer eﬀect dominates the free-rider eﬀect. Therefore, bilateral negotiations
with MFN is more likely to favor the applicant country as n increases. That means the
existing rule of accession negotiation in most international trade blocs, where bilateral ne-
gotiations with MFN are conducted, is more likely to favor the applicant (and thus induce
less trade liberalization from the applicant) in a large club than in a small one.
In section 2, we lay down the assumptions and preliminary features of the model. In
sections 3 and 4 we analyze bilateral negotiations with and without MFN, respectively. In
section 5, we compare the outcomes of the two regimes discussed in sections 3 and 4, and
then deduce the hardened bargainer eﬀect and free-rider eﬀect that contribute to the diﬀerent
negotiation outcomes. Section 6 discusses a generalization to the n-country case. Section 7
concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Suppose country 1 and 2 have already formed a club, and country 3 wants to join it. Suppose
the eﬀect of country 3 joining the club is that country 3 beneﬁts, but countries 1 and 2 have
to give up something. In other words, the beneﬁts to country 1, 2 and 3 before the applicant
makes any concessions to the existing members in return, are respectively
U1 < 0, U2 < 0, U3 > 0,
4and
U1 + U2 + U3 > 0
where Ui (i =1 ,2,3) is country i’s gain due to country 3 joining the club. Note that
we assume that country 3 gains while all existing members lose before country 3 makes any
concessions in return. A concrete example of this process is WTO accession. When a country
joins the WTO, it normally beneﬁts from being a member. The beneﬁts normally come from
the applicant country being able to access the markets of the existing members. On the other
hand, by having a new country joining the WTO, existing members have to grant market
access to the applicant, which is considered (or perceived as) a loss to these countries, at least
in the political sense. The accession of a new country in the WTO, however, is assumed
to be globally eﬃciency-enhancing so that aggregate world welfare increases. Therefore,
U1 + U2 + U3 > 0. We call U3 the beneﬁt of the accession to the applicant, while |U1| and
|U2| are called the costs of the accession to the members.
Let Ti denote the extent of market opening of country 3 to country i =1 ,2. The extent
of market opening determines how much country i gains (and how much country 3 loses)
from such a market opening policy. A concrete example of Ti is the reduction in speciﬁc
tariﬀs of goods imported from i to 3. We assume that if country 3 gives MFN treatment to
countries 1 and 2, then T1 = T2 = T. We want a model that captures the following features:
(1) ∂W3/∂Ti < 0f o ri =1 ,2. That is, the acceding country loses from making concessions.
(2) ∂Wi/∂Ti > 0f o ri =1 ,2. That is, each member gains from getting the acceding
country’s concessions.
(3) ∂Wj/∂Ti < 0f o ri =1 ,2a n dj =1 ,2a n di 6= j. This is because when an applicant
grants market access to a member country, it would normally hurt other member countries
who compete in the same market.
(4) ∂ (W1 + W2 + W3)/∂Ti > 0, or ∂ (W1 + W2)/∂Ti > |∂W3/∂Ti|. That is, trade liber-
alization by the applicant is globally welfare-improving.
In the appendix, we describe a “competing supplier model” with three countries and
three goods where each country imports one good but exports two goods. The competing
supplier model helps to motivate why it is desirable for the present model to capture the
above features.
Let us now develop a model to capture features (1) to (4) above. Let there be a parameter
5φi that captures the heterogeneity among the member countries. Speciﬁcally, assume that
φi increases with the size of country i and its depth of trade relationship with the applicant
country, i.e. φ1 >φ 2 if country 1 is larger than country 2 or country 1 has a deeper trade
relationship with the applicant country. If country 1 and country 2 are symmetric, then
φ1 = φ2.
Furthermore, make the following assumptions:
(A) ∂ (W1 + W2)/∂Ti = −λ(∂W3/∂Ti), where λ>1. That is, members’ total gains from
country 3’s market opening to country i is always λ times country 3’s loss. This satisﬁes
feature (4).3
(B) ∂Wi/∂Ti = λφi, i =1 ,2. This satisﬁes feature (2). The motivation behind this
assumption is that country size and the depth of trade relationship determine the country’s
increase in output (and therefore payoﬀ) in response to the acceding country’s market open-
ing. For example, if 1 is a larger country or has more to export to the applicant’s market
and 2 is a smaller country or has less to export to the applicant, then when country 3 opens
its market, country 1 will beneﬁt more than country 2 does because it has larger production
operations to beneﬁt from country 3’s market opening than country 2 does, even though
country 3 gives the same market access concessions to 1 and 2 (i.e. even though there is
MFN). The US, for example, beneﬁts more, in absolute terms, from China’s market opening
than, say, Singapore does.
(C) ∂Wj/∂Ti = −λβi
jφj (i,j =1 ,2a n di 6= j). An exogenous fraction βi
j of country j’s




i imply that i and j compete more intensely in country 3 market. This satisﬁes feature
(3).
(D) Assumptions (A), (B) and (C) together imply that ∂W3/∂Ti = −(1/λ)∂ (W1 + W2)/∂Ti =
−φi+φjβi
j (i,j =1 ,2a n di 6= j)w h i c hi sa s s u m e dt ob el e s st h a nz e r os oa st os a t i s f yf e a t u r e
(1).
In the appendix, we calibrate the present model to the “competing supplier model” and
obtain estimates of λ, β and φ, to demonstrate how theser parameters are related to the
3If political economy consideration induces a government to put more weight on the welfare of import-
competing ﬁrms, as will be the case if one adopts the “protection for sale” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994)
line of argument, then λ is reduced but φi would be larger for the same size of country i and same depth of
trade relationship. See footnote 12.
6size of each country and the depth of trade relationship, among other things. Moreover, the
present model can be used to calculate approximately the outcome of the tariﬀ-reduction
negotiations in a competing supplier model with and without MFN.
Based on the above assumptions, country 3’s payoﬀ after its concessions are made is
W3 = U3 − φ1(T1 − β
2
1T2) − φ2(T2 − β
1
2T1);
country 1’s payoﬀ is
W1 = U1 + λφ1(T1 − β
2
1T2);
while country 2’s payoﬀ is
W2 = U2 + λφ2(T2 − β
1
2T1).
T h eo u t c o m eo ft h ea c c e s s i o nn e g o t i a t i o n ,T1 and T2, must be such that W1, W2, W3 > 0.
Otherwise, one of the parties would not consent to the deal. This implies that φi(Ti−β
j
iTj) >
0f o ri,j =1 ,2a n di 6= j.W ec a l lφ1(T1 − β2
1T2)a n dφ2(T2 − β1
2T1) the costs and U3 the
beneﬁt to the applicant from the accession. Similarly, |Ui| (i =1 ,2) is called the cost and
λφi(Ti−β
j
iTj)t h eb e n e ﬁtt om e m b e ri from the accession. The diﬀerence between the beneﬁt
and the cost is called the payoﬀ to the country.
More generally, suppose there are n−1 existing members, call them countries 1 through
n−1, and suppose country n is the applicant country. Assume that Ui < 0f o ri =1 ,2...,n−1,
Un > 0a n d
P
j Uj > 0f o rj =1 ,2,...,n.W eh a v e









⎠ for i 6= n
and

















iTj > 0( i,j =1 ,2,...,n−1a n di 6= j)
for the deal to satisfy all countries.
Refer back for now to the 3-country case. In the following analysis, we shall assume
that U1, U2 and U3 are exogenous, while φi, β
j
i and λ are parameters. The quantities to
be negotiated are T1 and T2. When there is MFN rule, the constraint T1 = T2 = T is
exogenously imposed. When there is no MFN, no exogenous constraint on the relationship
between T1 and T2 exists.
7The assumption that U1, U2 and U3 are exogenous is consistent with many club enlarge-
ment rules. For example, a country that joins the WTO would be able to obtain tariﬀsa n d
market access concessions from existing members based on an equal-treatment principle.
There are usually very little extra concessions that an applicant can bargain for. All new
members get the same degree of market access in each of the existing member countries.
This assumption captures the rules of WTO accession negotiations (see World Trade Orga-
nization 1995a, 1995b and 2005). On the other hand, how much concession the applicant has
to make in the accession negotiations indeed vary enormously from case to case in practice.
For example, very few people would doubt that China made a lot more market opening
concessions when joining the WTO than, say, Latvia did (when measured in absolute mon-
etary terms). Note that Ui d o e sn o th a v et ob ep r o p o r t i o n a lt oφi,s i n c ed i ﬀerent member
countries have diﬀerent degrees of protectionism. For example, if a larger member country
(say 1) is more protectionist against other members while a smaller member country (say
2) is less protectionist against other members, country 3 can actually get lower beneﬁtf r o m
the market-opening of the larger country upon accession to the club. In that case, φ1 >φ 2
but |U1| < |U2|.
For those who are used to modeling trade liberalization as reduction in tariﬀso n l yi n
a trade model, the above speciﬁcation may seem too simple or lacking the required struc-
ture. However, as discussed in footnote 1, the items to be negotiated in a trade bloc can
include much more than tariﬀs. They include matters as diverse as investment, government
procurement, services, intellectual property rights, capital control, and so on. Hence, a one-
dimensional index of market access, which aﬀects payoﬀs linearly, may not be a bad ﬁrst
approximation. On the contrary, the modeling of trade liberalization as simply a reduction in
tariﬀs fails to capture many aspects of market access liberalization. Moreover, the outcome
of an analysis based on tariﬀ reductions in a trade model can very well be dependent on the
trade model used. Therefore, using a model with less structure than a formal trade model
yet retaining the most essential features may yield useful insights which cannot be obtained
from using a more structured trade model.
In the following analysis, we deﬁne WM
i and WN
i (where i =1 ,2,...,n) as the payoﬀ to
country i under negotiations with MFN and negotiations with No-MFN respectively, when
the total number of countries including the applicant country is n. Country n is designated
as the applicant country.
83 Negotiations without MFN
In accordance with the practice of many international trade clubs, such as the WTO, I assume
that the concessions made by the applicant is determined by a series of bilateral negotiations.
We shall use the Nash cooperative bargaining framework to model each bilateral negotiation.
We assume that unanimous approval of the members is required for the applicant to join
the club. Therefore, in case any of the bilateral negotiations fail, the payoﬀs to all countries
would be zero. Consequently, the threat point of all bilateral negotiations is (0, 0).4 It can be
easily shown that, if the negotiations are carried out sequentially, and the earlier negotiators
can lock in the commitments of the applicant, then the distribution of payoﬀsa m o n gt h e
members depends on the order of the negotiations, with the earlier negotiators getting higher
payoﬀs. This would not be a desirable outcome for a club such as the WTO, since (i) it would
be in the interest of the applicant not to lock in any deal until it has negotiated with all parties
concerned; (ii) the countries who negotiate later would object to the applicant locking in deals
with earlier negotiators, since they would be disadvantaged. In short, it is more reasonable
to assume that “nothing is agreed until everybody has agreed”. To capture this aspect of
the accession negotiation, we deﬁne the solution to the grand negotiation as one such that,
given the bargaining solutions of all other bilateral bargainings, each pair of countries that
engage in a bilateral bargaining has no incentive to change their own bargaining solution. In
other words, the solution of the grand negotiation is a Nash equilibrium with the strategy
4An alternative way to model the threat point is to assume that in case the acceding country reaches
bilateral agreements with some but not all members (of the Working Party, which consists of all interested
WTO members), it can still enter the WTO with those negotiated agreements being honored. We argue,
however, that this assumption does not reﬂect the operation of the real world. As a matter of fact, most
bilateral agreements reached during the accession process are conditional on successful accession. They would
become invalid if the accession application fails. Take the example of the Sino-US trade agreement signed at
the end of 1999 as part of China’s accession negotiations to the WTO. The fact is that the agreement would
only be valid conditional on China’s successful accession to the WTO. And successful accession normally
requires the blessings of all the important members of the Working Party. Therefore, the appropriate threat
point of China in a bilateral accession negotiation is that there is no agreement with any member (of the
Working Party).
9space being the concessions {T1, T2,...,Tn−1} made by the applicant to the members.56
Note that the beneﬁts that country 3 gets from countries 1 and 2 cannot be negotiated,
since they are granted to all new members on an equal-treatment basis. Therefore, U1, U2
and U3 are exogenous. We only focus on the concessions made by the applicant. Therefore,
the quantities to be negotiated are T1 and T2.
For each bilateral negotiation, we shall adopt the Nash cooperative bargaining solution
and assume that countries have the same bargaining power.7 Admittedly, bargaining power
can aﬀect the share of surplus obtained by the acceding country. This can possibly explain
why some countries seem to get worse deals than others in their accession negotiations.
However, our goal is not to explain the distribution of payoﬀs across acceding countries, but
to explain the impacts of the MFN rule on the payoﬀs to all the countries concerned in a
certain accession episode. So, without loss of generality, we assume the simple case that all
5This solution concept accords with the “Technical Note on the Accession Process: Note by the Secre-
tariat” issued by the WTO (2005, 7th paragraph of Overview), which states that “Bilateral market access
negotiations begin following the Applicant’s submission of oﬀers on concessions and commitments in the
goods and services sectors. As the negotiations advance, these initial market access oﬀers are revised to take
account of the progress achieved or expected.”
6It turns out that this solution is the same as the multilateral Nash bargaining solution whereby T1 and
T2 are chosen to maximize the product of the surpluses of all three countries. Incidentally, this solution
would converge to the same outcome as the multilateral bargaining described in Krishna and Serrano (1996)
and Chae and Yang (1994). Imagine players standing next to each other in a circle. Chae and Yang (1994)
describe a n-person bargaining game where, ﬁrst of all, the ﬁrst (randomly chosen) player makes an oﬀer to
the player on his left hand side in a bilateral bargaining. If the latter accepts, he exits the game with the
oﬀer in hand. Then the ﬁrst player would proceed with making oﬀer to the player on his left hand side now
left in the game in another round of similar bilateral bargaining. The diﬀerence with our model is that if the
oﬀer is rejected, then the responder becomes the proposer in the next round of bilateral bargaining. This
time the responder would again be the player to his left. Krishna and Serrano (1996) consider a multilateral
bargaining game with n players. Imagine players standing next to each other in a circle. The ﬁrst player is
chosen randeomly, and he proposes the shares of every player. The players who accept his proposed shares
would exit the game with the shares secured. Then, in the next round, the next player to the ﬁrst’s left
hand side still left in the game would propose the shares of the rest of the players left in the game. Again,
those players who accept their shares exit the game with their shares secured. Then the game goes on.
Both procedures yield equilibrium outcomes that approximate the Nash bargaining solution when the
players are patient. Both yield unique perfect equilibria.
7That is, the bargaining problem between country 3 and country i is to solve max
Ti
W3(T1,T 2)αWi(T1,T 2)1−α where i =1 ,2. Equal bargaining power means that α =0 .5. The problem is
equivalent to solving max
Ti
W3(T1,T 2) · Wi(T1,T 2).
10countries have the same bargaining power.8
The solution of the game is as follows. For any given T1, there is an optimal T2 which
is a solution to the Nash bargaining between country 3 and country 2. This allows us to
compute the best response function expressing T2 as a function of T1. Likewise, for any
given T2, there is an optimal T1 that solves the Nash bargaining game between country 3
and country 1. This gives us the best response function expressing T1 as a function of T2.
In equilibrium, each country pair must be satisﬁed with its negotiation outcome given the
negotiation outcome of all other country pairs. This satisﬁes the requirement that “nothing
is agreed until everybody has agreed”.
Negotiation between Countries 2 and 3
The Nash bargaining problem is given by max
T2





U3 − φ1(T1 − β
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T2 c a nb es o l v e df r o mt h eﬁrst order condition above to obtain the best response function
T2(T1). The best response function represents the optimal bargaining solution between
countries 2 and 3 given the bargaining solution between 1 and 3. Note that the second order
condition φ2−β2
1φ1 > 0, which is equivalent to ∂W3/∂T2 < 0, is what we assumed to be true
in feature (1) in section 2. Likewise, the second order condition for the negotiation between
countries 1 and 3 is equivalent to ∂W3/∂T1 < 0, which is assumed to be true.






W2 = λφ2W3 (2)
8We could assume diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent bargaining powers, but the basic conclusions would
not be aﬀected.
11Negotiation between Countries 1 and 3
The bargaining problem here is given by max
T1





U3 − φ1(T1 − β
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Again, the best response function (the optimal bargaining solution between countries 1 and
3 given the optimal bargaining solution between countries 2 and 3) can be solved from the
above ﬁrst order condition. In equilibrium both best response functions should be satisﬁed.
Since there is no need to make use of the best response functions, we do not present their
explicit forms here, but we only bear in mind that they can be calculated. Nonetheless, for
the sake of completeness, we present the best response functions and the “stability” of the
Nash equilibrium in the Appendix.






W1 = λφ1W3.( 4 )
In order for countries 1 and 3 to be satisﬁed with their own bargaining solution given the
bargaining solution of countries 2 and 3, and vice versa, it must be the case that both ﬁrst
order conditions (2) and (4) are satisﬁed, which in turn implies that





















Note that the ratio W1+W2
W3 is an indicator of the applicant’s payoﬀ –al o w e rr a t i o








Tj, the total amount of concessions the applicant grants to the members, is
lower.
12Three conclusions emerge from the above results. First, country 3 gets lower payoﬀ
than either country 1 or 2, since W1
W3 >λ>1a n dW2
W3 >λ>1. Second, the distribution
of payoﬀsi si n d e p e n d e n to fU1, U2 and U3.T h i r d , a s e a c h o f β1
2 or β2
1 gets larger, the
acceding country has to make more concessions. That is, as the member countries compete
more intensely in the applicant’s market (for example, they all export similar goods to the
applicant), the applicant has to give more concessions to the members. When a member
country’s beneﬁt gets eroded more by its competitors as the applicant opens its market, it
strengthens the former’s bargaining position so it can demand more concessions from the
applicant. Therefore, we have
Proposition 1. Without MFN, the acceding country gets a lower payoﬀ than each of the
member countries. Moreover, as the member countries compete more intensely in the acceding
country market, the acceding country has to make more concessions to the members.
Deﬁne f W1 ≡ W1
λ , e U1 ≡ U1
λ , f W2 ≡ W2
λ , e U2 ≡ U2
λ . From the primitive deﬁnitions of W1, W2
and W3 given in Section 2, it can be shown that
f W1 + f W2 + W3 = e U1 + e U2 + U3 = U3 −
¯ ¯ ¯ e U1
¯ ¯ ¯ −
¯ ¯ ¯ e U2
¯ ¯ ¯ ≡ X (6)
where X is the maximum payoﬀ available to the applicant if it merely oﬀers the existing
members just enough to gain their willingness to allow its admission to the club. However,
if we treat f W1, f W2 and W3 as “normalized” indicators of the payoﬀso ft h ec o u n t r i e s ,X
c a na l s ob et r e a t e da st h e“ s i z eo ft h ep i e ” :W es t a r tw i t hat o t a ls u mo ft h ep a y o ﬀst oa l l
countries ( e U1+ e U2+U3)e q u a lt oX,a n de n du pw i t hat o t a ls u mo fp a y o ﬀse q u a lt oX after
concessions by the applicant are made (f W1 + f W2 + W3), no matter what the concessions
are. Moreover, any gains for each existing member must be at the expense of the applicant.
Therefore, this is exactly like dividing a pie of ﬁxed size.9
From (5), we can easily see that








:1=η1 : η2 :1 ( 7 )
9The only diﬀerence between this game and a zero sum game is that for each unit of payoﬀ g i v e nu pb y
the applicant, the bargaining opponent gets λ>1 units of payoﬀ given up. That is, it is as if one unit of the
applicant’s payoﬀ can be converted into λ units of the member’s payoﬀ. Once the payoﬀs of the members
are “normalized” by converting them into units of the applicant’s payoﬀ, the game is the same as dividing
ap i eo fﬁxed size.
13w h e r ew ed e ﬁne η1 ≡
φ1
φ1−β1














¯ ¯ ¯ e U1
¯ ¯ ¯ −










Therefore, country 3 gets less than 1/3 of the pie when there is no MFN rule.
4 Negotiations with MFN
Suppose T∗
1 is the Nash bargaining solution of the negotiation between countries 1 and 3,
subject to the constraint of MFN. The variable T∗
2 is similarly deﬁned between countries 2
and 3. If country 3 gives MFN treatment to countries 1 and 2, T∗
1 in fact sets the lower
bound of the concession that country 1 gets from 3. The concession that country 1 gets from
3 eventually can be augmented if the Nash bargaining solution T∗
2 between countries 2 and
3 is greater than T∗
1. The same applies to the negotiation between countries 2 and 3.
Negotiation between 2 and 3
Consider a Nash bargaining between 2 and 3. Let T∗
2 be the Nash bargaining solution
that sets the lower bound of what country 2 is willing to accept from country 3 subject to the
constraint of MFN. Then, T∗
2 is the solution to max
T2
W3(T1,T 2) · W2(T1,T 2)w h e r eT1 = T2.
Note that as countries 2 and 3 negotiate over T2, they take into account the fact that any































where θ1 ≡ φ1(1 − β2
1)a n dθ2 ≡ φ2(1 − β1
2). Note that λθi represents the marginal beneﬁt
∂Wi/∂Ti that country i can reap from the increased market access oﬀered by the acceding
country, taking into account the fact that each increased market access is available to all
m e m b e r so naM F Nb a s i s .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,θi represents the marginal cost −∂Wn/∂Ti
to the applicant of oﬀering concessions to country i under MFN.
14Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition is
λθ2[U3 − (θ1 + θ2)T
∗
2] − (θ1 + θ2)(U2 + λθ2T
∗
2)=0 . ( 9 )
Negotiation between 1 and 3
Consider now the Nash bargaining between 1 and 3. Let T∗
1 be the Nash bargaining
solution that sets the lower bound of what country 1 is willing to accept from country
3 subject to the constraint of MFN. Then, T∗
1 solves max
T1
W3(T1,T 2) · W1(T1,T 2)w h e r e









Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition is
λθ1 [U3 − (θ1 + θ2)T
∗
1] − (θ1 + θ2)(U1 + λθ1T
∗
1) = 0. (10)
Now, it is clear that the equilibrium outcome of the negotiations subject to MFN is
T1 = T2 = T =m a x [ T∗
1,T∗
2].


























































.( 1 1 )
When T∗
1 >T ∗
2, country 1’s negotiation outcome is binding, and we say that country
2 free-rides on country 1’s stronger bargaining position. The above equation says that
15under MFN, country 1’s negotiation outcome is binding iﬀ its cost-beneﬁtr a t i o( |U1|/θ1)
under MFN is greater than that of country 2 (|U2|/θ2) .T h ed i v e r g e n c eb e t w e e nT∗
1 and T∗
2
comes from the “asymmetry” in cost-beneﬁt ratio between countries 1 and 2 under MFN.





2 are equal. In this case, the applicant country does not have to give
excess concession to the member country that free-rides the other one. In fact, there is no
free-riding at all.
We now want to deduce conditions under which MFN favors the applicant country. Deﬁn-
ing WM
3 as the equilibrium value of W3 under MFN rule, we have
W
M











We compare the case with MFN and the one without MFN in the next section.
5 Analysis



































where it is recalled that X is the “size of the pie”. From the above equation, it is clear
that the share of surplus of the applicant is dependent not only on X but also on the size
distribution of |U1|/θ1 and |U2|/θ2. This is contrary to the case when there is no MFN rule,
where WN
3 is dependent on X and not on the size distribution of |U1|/θ1 and |U2|/θ2 (see
equation (8)).
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of the second line shows that the applicant gets half
of “the size of the pie” if the member countries are symmetric. Since 1
2X is more than 1
3X,
w h i c hi si nt u r nm o r et h a nWN





θ2 ), the acceding country makes less concessions under MFN rule– without
MFN rule, the applicant can only get less than a third of “the size of the pie” instead of one
16half. The second term on the right hand side is the adjustment for the asymmetry between
the members. The adjustment is always negative, since it reﬂects how much extra concessions
the applicant has to make because some member countries free-ride on the member country
with the strongest bargaining power.
From (8) and (13), it is straightforward to show that country 3 gains more when MFN























> 0( 1 4 )
Equation (14) demonstrates the two eﬀects that lead to the divergence between the case
with MFN and without MFN. The ﬁrst eﬀect can be called the hardened bargainer eﬀect.
Since all countries have the foresight to realize that for each dollar that the applicant gives
up to a member country, many more dollars have to be given up by the applicant to other
member countries, MFN would harden the applicant’s bargaining position. Therefore, the
hardened bargainer eﬀect tends to favor the applicant under MFN as opposed to no-MFN.
The magnitude of this eﬀect is [1/2 − 1/(1 + η1 + η2)]X. As it turns out, it is proportional
to the size of the pie, and increases with the intensity of competition between the members
in the applicant’s market.10
In the appendix, we calibrate the present model to the competing supplier model, focusing
on tariﬀ r e d u c t i o n sa st h ec o n c e s s i o n st ob em a d eb yt h ea p p l i c a n t .Is h o wh o wt h es i z eo f
the pie X is related to the sizes of the countries and the depth of their trade relationship,
and how U1, U2, U3 are related to the sizes of the countries and the tariﬀ reductions from
the members that the applicant gets from joining the club. The hardened bargaining eﬀect
is also shown.
Deﬁne μ1 = φ1 − β1
2φ2 and μ2 = φ2 − β2
1φ1. It can be seen that μi is in fact equal to
|∂W3/∂Ti|. Now we can demonstrate more clearly the hardened bargainer eﬀect by noting




[U3 − μ1T1 − μ2T2]
h








since in equilibrium the negotiating partners in this negotiation treat T2 as given.
10Recall that ηi =
φi
φi−βi
jφj increases with βi
j.
17On the other hand, with MFN, assuming symmetry between countries 1 and 2, the
negotiation between countries 1 and 3 is binding, and the ﬁrst order condition that determines
T1 is obtained from
max
T1
[U3 − μ1T1 − μ2T1]
h






[U3 − μ1T1 − μ2T2]
h







= 1 is imposed.
That is, for each dollar given up by country 3 to country 1, μ2/μ1 dollars are given up to
country 2 too.
Therefore the two problems are of the same form, both being
max
T1
[U3 − μ1T1 − μ2T2]
h





with the only diﬀerence being dT2
dT1 =0i nt h eﬁrst case and dT2
dT1 = 1 in the second case. The






























From this we see that a larger dT2
dT1 leads to a higher W3/W1.S i n c e a h i g h e r W3/W1
signiﬁes less concessions made by country 3 to country 1, the hardened bargainer eﬀect is
evident.
The second eﬀect can be called free-rider eﬀect, in the sense that any deal that the
applicant makes with a member country can be made more unfavorable to the applicant by
subsequent negotiations with other member countries. This would tend to hurt the applicant




θ2 , which in turn leads to a diﬀerence between T∗
1 and T∗
2.
Which eﬀect would dominate under asymmetry? One scenario when MFN favors the
applicant is when free-rider eﬀect is small. This will be the case when
|U1|
θ1 is suﬃciently close
to
|U2|
θ2 . Therefore, we conclude that
Proposition 2. MFN favors the applicant if the distribution of the cost-beneﬁtr a t i o so ft h e
members under MFN, |Ui|/θi, is not too uneven under MFN, ceteris paribus.




θ2 ,t h efree-rider eﬀect disappears.
From (8), we see that WN
3 increases with U3, everything else being equal. According to
(14), since WM
3 −WN
3 increases with U3, while other terms in the equation are independent
of U3, we can conclude that MFN would favor the applicant as long as U3 is suﬃciently large.
So, we state this result in
Proposition 3. MFN favors the applicant if its gross beneﬁt from joining the club, U3,i s
suﬃciently large given |U1| and |U2|, ceteris paribus.
The above proposition holds because the hardened bargainer eﬀect would be larger when
the “size of the pie” is larger, which is true when U3 is larger, given |U1| + |U2|.




λ ,w ec a ns e et h a tt h eR H So f( 1 4 )i n c r e a s e sw i t hλ.
Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. MFN favors the applicant as long as λ is suﬃciently large, i.e. each member’s
beneﬁti ss u ﬃciently larger than the applicant’s cost when the latter opens its market.
There are two explanations to Proposition 4. First, the hardened bargainer eﬀect is larger
when the “size of the pie” is larger, which is true when λ is larger. Second, the free-rider
eﬀect is smaller the larger is λ. The intuition is that as each unit of payoﬀ g i v e nu pb y
the applicant is converted into more units of payoﬀ for each member country, the latter
would not be able to bargain as hard as before, resulting in the applicant having to make
fewer concessions. The free-rider eﬀect is smaller because the country with the strongest
bargaining position bargains less hard than before, just like all other members. The size of
the pie is larger because the maximum payoﬀ available to the applicant when it makes just
enough concessions to induce each member to allow its admission is now higher.
Finally, as each β
j
i gets larger (say by increasing by the same factor), ηi also gets larger,
and more concessions has to be made by the applicant country without the MFN rule.
According to (14), it makes it more likely that MFN favors the applicant. Therefore, we
have
19Proposition 5. It is more likely that MFN favors the applicant as each β
j
i gets larger, i.e. as
member countries compete more severely in the acceding country’s market.
The intuition is that for each dollar country 3 gives up to a member country, it gets back
some cents from other member countries, and this weakens country 3’s bargaining position
when there is no MFN requirement. The more intense the competition between members in
country 3’s market, the more country 3 can get back from other member countries for each
dollar it yields in a bilateral negotiation, and therefore the weaker is the bargaining position
of country 3 without MFN rule.
6 n countries
T h ea b o v ep r o p o s i t i o n sc a nb er e a d i l ye x t e n d e dt ot h ec a s ew i t hn countries where n>3.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that it is more likely that the hardened bargainer eﬀect dominates
the free-rider eﬀect as n increases by replication of existing types of member countries.
Unless otherwise stated, let the operators
P





6.1 Negotiations without MFN
Negotiation between Countries i and n
The problem is given by
max
Ti


























































kφk for j,k =1 ,2,...,n − 1a n dj 6= k.
20First order condition:











⇒ Wi = ληiWn











is satisﬁed as it is equivalent to ∂Wn/∂Ti < 0 ,w h i c hi sa s s u m e dt ob et r u es oa st os a t i s f y
feature (1) in section 2.
























X since ηj > 1f o ra l lj.( 1 5 )
I ts h o w st h a tt h ea p p l i c a n tg e t sl e s st h a n1 /n o ft h es i z eo ft h ep i e .
6.2 Negotiations with MFN









⎠(Uk + λθkTk)f o r k =1 ,2,...,n − 1








. It is clear that λθj represents the marginal beneﬁt ∂Wj/∂Tj
that country j can reap from the increased market access oﬀered by the acceding country,
taking into account the fact that each increased market access is available to all members on
a MFN basis. On the other hand, θj is the marginal cost −∂Wn/∂Tj to country n of oﬀering
concessions to country j under MFN. Hence θj m u s tb eg r e a t e rt h a nz e r os oa st os a t i s f y
feature (1) of section 2.































λθk > 0 for all k =1 ,2,...,n− 1, a suﬃcient
condition of which is θk > 0 for all k =1 ,2,...,n− 1. But this must be true by assumption
as θk = −∂Wn/∂Tk > 0 must hold so as to satisfy feature (1) in section 2.























































Hence, with MFN in place, the payoﬀ to the applicant, Wn,i sg i v e nb y
W
M
































The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of the last line shows the hardened bargainer eﬀect,
while the second term shows the adjustment to take into account the free-riders eﬀect.
22The hardened bargainer eﬀect allows the applicant to get a higher payoﬀ under MFN rule
under symmetry. Regardless of n, the applicant gets one half of the size of the pie under








, the payoﬀ without MFN. However, this payoﬀ has to be adjusted
for the extra concessions it has to make because of the asymmetry between the member
countries.
Comparison Between MFN and No-MFN




























In the following cases, when the distribution of
|Uj|
θj is very skewed, we have WM
n −WN
n < 0:
(1) |Um| is very large compared with all other |Uj| where j 6= m,n;o r( 2 )θm is very small
compared with all other θj for j 6= m,n.















Perhaps a more interesting result is that if n increases by duplication of existing types
of member countries, while Un/
P
j |Uj| stays constant, then WM
n − WN
n increases, and it is
more likely that the applicant is favored by the MFN rule.11 For example, suppose there are
two types of member countries: Type 1 corresponds to |U1|, θ1 and Type 2 corresponds to
|U2|, θ2. Suppose there are n1 Type 1 countries and n2 Type 2 countries in the beginning,
so that 1+
P
j ηj = n1η1+n2η2+1. If we duplicate the existing member countries, 1+
P
j ηj
becomes 2(n1η1 +n2η2)+1. Moreover, the fact that Un/
P
j |Uj| stays constant implies that
Un is doubled. Therefore X i sa l s od o u b l e d( t h es i z eo ft h ep i ed o u b l e sa st h es i z eo ft h e

















































11It makes sense to assume that the ratio of the beneﬁt to the applicant to the total costs of the existing
members to be constant, as the total beneﬁts from trade should be higher with a larger trading bloc.
23The free-rider eﬀect is doubled, but the hardened bargainer eﬀect is more than doubled.
Even if WM
n −WN
n < 0 before, it is possible that WM
n −WN




Hence, we can state
P r o p o s i t i o n6 . P r o p o s i t i o n s1 ,2 ,34a n d5a l la p p l yt on> 3. Moreover, as n increases
by replication of existing types of members while Un/
P
j6=n |Uj| stays constant, the hardened
bargainer eﬀect strengthens relative to the free-rider eﬀect, and the applicant is more likely
t ob ef a v o r e db yt h eM F Nr u l e .
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we compare the eﬀects of two diﬀerent negotiation rules in club enlargement
negotiation. In keeping with the rules of most international organizations, such as the
WTO, NAFTA and the proposed FTAA, we assume that unanimous approval of existing
(major) members is required for the applicant to join the club. We investigate the welfare
implications of two diﬀerent accession negotiation rules, namely the applicant conducting a
series of bilateral negotiations with and without the MFN rule. When members are not too
dissimilar, we ﬁnd that negotiations without MFN induce the acceding country to liberalize
trade more than with MFN.
When members are asymmetric, we ﬁnd that there are two eﬀects of the MFN rule, viz.
the hardened bargainer eﬀect and the free-rider eﬀect. The former eﬀect tends to favor the
applicant (and hinders trade liberalization), while the latter eﬀect tends to hurt the applicant
(and enhances trade liberalization). We ﬁnd that the latter eﬀect is stronger the more uneven
is the distribution of the cost-beneﬁt ratios of the members under MFN. In particular, when
the cost-beneﬁt ratios are equal across all members, the free-rider eﬀect disappears, and the
MFN rule would unambiguously favor the applicant compared with the case without MFN
rule. Moreover, if the “size of the pie” is suﬃciently large, then the hardened bargainer eﬀect
would be large enough to dominate the free-rider eﬀect, and the applicant is again favored
by the MFN rule.
The above ﬁndings concerning the eﬀects of MFN rule runs parallel to similar ﬁndings
in the industrial organization and law & economics literature. However, the results deviates
from the typical ones obtained in the Rubinstein-type alternating-oﬀer bargaining literature,
24where players negotiate to divide a pie of given size. In that literature, symmetry of the
non-central players is almost always (implicitly) assumed. As we have seen in this paper, the
result can be very misleading if we fail to account for the free-rider eﬀect due to asymmetry
of the non-central players.
Finally, another interesting and novel result is that, as the number of countries increases
by duplication of existing types of member countries, it is more likely that the hardened
bargainer eﬀect dominates the free-rider eﬀect. Therefore, bilateral negotiations with MFN
is more likely to favor the applicant country as n increases. That means the existing rule
of accession negotiation in most international trade blocs, where bilateral negotiations with
MFN are conducted, is more likely to favor the applicant in a large club than in a small one.
25Appendixes
A A Competing Supplier Model
In this appendix, we present a simple competing-supplier model to show that the features to
be captured as listed in Section 2 are reasonable. First, we present the model; then we derive
some properties of the model which are consistent with the features we want to capture as
stated in the main text of the paper. Finally, we calibrate the model in the main text to
this model.
Consider a three-country world in which each country imports one good from each of
the two other countries. (The extension to n-country case is straightforward.) This model
is useful for analyzing the role played by the MFN principle, since each country can impose
diﬀerent tariﬀso nd i ﬀerent trading partners.




D0,w h e r eDi denotes consumption of good i and good 0 is the numeraire good. This utility




j is the domestic price of good j in country i. Country i is assumed to have a ﬁxed
endowment x0 of good 0, y of good i a n da ne n d o w m e n tx (where x>y )o fn o n - n u m e r a i r e
good j 6= i. Markets are perfectly competitive, as there are a large number of buyers and
sellers in each market in all countries. Under these assumptions, it can be shown that the
non-numeraire goods would each sell for a price of A−(2x + y)/3 in a free trade equilibrium,
with country i importing (x − y)/3 units of good i from each of the other countries. The
numeraire good will not be traded under free trade, but is introduced to serve as a means
of making transfers between the countries.
We assume that country i’s only trade instrument is an import tariﬀ. Since country i
is the only importer of good i and only imposes tariﬀs on good i, we can drop the country




i − tij (and Pk
i = Pi
i − tik)f o ri 6= j 6= k. This condition can then
be substituted into the market clearing conditions to solve for Pi
i and imports by country i
from country j, Mij,
26P
i
i = A −




x − y − 2tij + tik
3
The expression for Mik can be derived similarly. An increase in tij will improve the terms of
trade of countries i and k, but will worsen the terms of trade of country j.
It will be assumed that the trade negotiators choose tariﬀs to maximize a social welfare
function of its own country. Tariﬀ revenue, consumer welfare, and producer welfare all receive
equal weight of one. Under this assumption, the national welfare function of country i can
be expressed as
W




















The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is consumer surplus, the second term is export
sector revenue, the third term is import sector revenue, and the forth term represents tariﬀ
revenue.
In the absence of a trade agreement, the optimal tariﬀ policy for country i is obtained
by choosing tij (j 6= i) to maximize (17). It is straightforward to show that due to the
symmetry between the countries, the optimal tariﬀ policy will have equal tariﬀs on imports





a n dw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a t x − y>0( 1 8 )
Due to the separability of markets and the endowment pattern, the optimal trade policy
of country i is independent of tariﬀs set by other countries and (18) will be the tariﬀsi nt h e
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. This reﬂects the standard prisoner’s dilemma problem
of trade policy, since all countries would gain by multilateral tariﬀ reductions as long as the





























[−11tij +7 tik + x − y]





















(4tij − 2tik − 2x +2 y)



















(tij − 2tik + x − y)
> 0i f x − y is suﬃciently larger than tij and tik
Let i =3 ,j=1a n dk =2 .A si nt h em a i nt e x t ,c o u n t r i e s1a n d2a r ea s s u m e dt ob e
existing members while country 3 is the applicant. Note that increasing t31 (t32)i se q u i v a l e n t
to decreasing T1 (T2) in the main text. Therefore, the signs of the above derivatives mirror
the features to be captured as stated in Section 2 of the paper, namely, (1) ∂W3
∂Tj < 0f o r
j =1 ,2; (2)
∂Wj
∂Tj > 0f o rj =1 ,2; (3)
∂Wk
∂Tj < 0f o rj,k =1 ,2a n dj 6= k.
A Calibration Exercise:
Note that all countries are symmetric. Maintain the assumption that i =3 ,j ,k=1 , 2 ,
j 6= k,a n dl e tt3j = t3k = t =( x − y)/32 before the accession negotiation. The negotiation
















































= λβφ for j,k =1 ,2, j 6= k
Restrictly speaking, the derivatives are dependent on t. Note, however, that I have chosen
a t that is small enough compared with x−y so that the magnitudes of the derivatives do not
change much even as t is lowered, and so I can assume that the above derivatives are more
or less independent of t as it is lowered. Therefore, we can solve that βk
j = β
j
k = β =0 .5
(for j,k =1 ,2), λ =1 .1, and that φ can be any positive number. Since λ>1, trade
liberalization does increase global welfare, which accords with the model in the main text.










Note that φ =0 .195(x − y).12 Note also that x − y reﬂects both the size of each economy
and the depth of trade relationship between them: x − y can be large only when x is large
(size of economies are large), and x − y is large (they trade a lot). This accords with the
characterization that φ increases with the size of the member country and its depth of trade
relationship with the applicant country.
Assume that tj3 = tk3 = t0 =( x − y)/32 and that tjk = tkj =0( f o rj,k =1 ,2) before the
accession negotiation. Then we can calculate the values of U1, U2 and U3. If country 3 joins















0 − 2(x − y)] < 0f o r j =1 ,2
12If we try to capture political economy by putting a weight α>1o nt h et e r mPi
iy in the func-
tion Wi in equation (17), as one would do following Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) argument, then
∂Wi
∂tij = 1
9 [−11tij +7 tik + x +( 3 α − 4)y], but ∂Wj
∂tij and ∂Wk
∂tij remain unchanged. Therefore, ∂W3
∂Tj =
1
9 [−4t + x +( 3 α − 4)y] while ∂Wj
∂Tj and ∂Wk
∂Tj remain the same. Hence, the estimated φ would be higher
than 0.195(x−y), and λ would be less than 1.1. In other words, political economy consideration that makes








0 + x − y) > 0f o r j,k =1 ,2, j 6= k
As t0 is lowered from (x − y)/32 to zero, we can easily calculate the change in welfare of


































−Uj for j =1 ,2



































+ x − y
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+( x − y)
¸ (x − y)
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Since X>0, there is surplus to be split among the three countries, which accords with
t h em o d e li nt h em a i nt e x t .
Moreover, it is straightforward to calculate that η1 = η2 =2 ,s ot h a tw i t hn oM F N
WN
3 = X
5 , f WN
1 = 2X






5 , whereas under MFN we have
30WM
3 = X
2 , f WM
1 = X






4 . Hence, the hardened bargainer
eﬀect is evident. There is no free-rider eﬀect in this case as countries 1 and 2 are symmetric.
In general, if t = k(x−y), then λ = 1−4k
1−2k > 1 (which demonstrates that trade liberalization
is always good, consistent with our model); φ = 2
9(x − y)(1 − 4k) (which shows that if k
is small so that the there is more trade between the applicant and each member country
to begin with, then φ is larger, which accords with our characterization of φ); and β =0 .5
all the time. If t0 = k0(x − y), then U3 =
4k0(1−k0)(x−y)2










(1 − k0) − 1−2.5k0
λ
i
> 0. This shows that (i) the size of the pie is
always positive, and (ii) the larger the countries, the larger is the pie, which accords with
t h em o d e li nt h em a i nt e x t .
B The Best Response Funcions
Equation (1) is equivalent to
T2 =
[λφ2U3 − (φ2 − β2
1φ1)U2] − λφ2 [(φ1 − β1
2φ2) − β1
2 (φ2 − β2
1φ1)]T1
2λφ2 (φ2 − β2
1φ1)
=
[λφ2U3 − ψ2U2] − λφ2 [ψ1 − β1
2ψ2]T1
2λφ2ψ2
where ψ1 = φ1 − β1
2φ2 > 0a n dψ2 = φ2 − β2
1φ1 > 0. Name this best response function
T2(T1). It is assumed that φ1 − 2β1
2φ2 ≥ 0; consequently, ψ1 − β1
2ψ2 > 0a n ds ot h eb e s t
response function is downward sloping in (T1,T 2) space. Its slope is given by dT2/dT1|BRF2 =
−[ψ1 − β1
2ψ2]/2ψ2 < 0.
Interchanging the subscripts (and superscripts) 1 and 2 in the above equation, we can
obtain the best response function corresponding to equation (3):
T1 =
[λφ1U3 − ψ1U1] − λφ1 [ψ2 − β2
1ψ1]T2
2λφ1ψ1
Name this best response function T1(T2). Similarly, it is assumed that φ2 − 2β2
1φ1 ≥ 0;
consequently ψ2−β2
1ψ1 > 0 and so the best response function is downward sloping in (T1,T 2)
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Figure 1: Nash equilibrium in bargaining outcomes. T1 is the outcome of bargaining between
countries 3 and 1; T2 is the outcome of bargaining between countries 3 and 2.
Now,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dT2
dT1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
BRF1
−
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dT2
dT1











4ψ1ψ2 − (ψ1 − β1
2ψ2)(ψ2 − β2
1ψ1)
2ψ2 (ψ2 − β2
1ψ1)
=







2ψ2 (ψ2 − β2
1ψ1)
> 0
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is stable. Figure 1 shows the best response functions.
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